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ABSTRACT
Near-death experiences (NDEs) are usually associated with positive affect, however, a small
proportion are considered distressing. We aimed to look into the proportion of distressing NDEs
in a sample of NDE narratives, categorise distressing narratives according to Greyson and Bush’s
classification (inverse, void or hellish), and compare distressing and “classical” NDEs. Participants
wrote down their experience, completed the Memory Characteristics Questionnaire (assessing
the phenomenology of memories) and the Greyson scale (characterising content of NDEs). The
proportion of suicidal attempts, content and intensity of distressing and classical NDEs were
compared using frequentist and Bayesian statistics. Distressing NDEs represent 14% of our
sample (n = 123). We identified 8 inverse, 8 hellish and 1 void accounts. The proportion of
suicide survivors is higher in distressing NDEs as compared to classical ones. Finally, memories
of distressing NDEs appear as phenomenologically detailed as classical ones. Distressing NDEs
deserve careful consideration to ensure their integration into experiencers’ identity.
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Having the sensation of being out of the physical body,
seeing a bright light or meeting a deceased relative are
features that one can experience when being close to
death (Greyson, 1983). Near-death experiences (NDEs)
typically occur during non-ordinary mental expressions
and following life-threatening situations (Facco, Agrillo,
& Greyson, 2015; Hou, Huang, Prakash, & Chaudhury,
2013; Van Lommel, Van Wees, Meyers, & Elfferich, 2001).
They have been reported in 6–23% of cardiac arrest survi-
vors (Parnia et al., 2014; Parnia, Waller, Yeates, & Fenwick,
2001; Schwaninger, Eisenberg, Kenneth, & Weiss, 2002;
Van Lommel et al., 2001) and have generally been associ-
ated with positive emotions, such as peacefulness or a
sense of harmony with the universe (Charland-Verville
et al., 2014). Moreover, the memory of these experiences
seems to be vivid and highly detailed (Martial et al.,
2017; Moore & Greyson, 2017; Palmieri et al., 2014; Thon-
nard et al., 2013) as assessed by the Memory Character-
istics Questionnaire (MCQ) (Johnson, Foley, Suengas, &
Raye, 1988). Several authors have already highlighted
the powerful changes triggered by NDEs on the lives of
people who have lived these experiences (so-called
NDErs), such as a reduced fear of death or being less
materialistic (Groth-Marnat & Summers, 1998; Van
Lommel et al., 2001).
Although generally described as pleasant and leading
to positive changes, a small proportion of NDEs has been
depicted as negative and sometimes “hellish”. To date,
only a few studies have addressed these distressing
experiences and we do not precisely know their causes
and potential consequences (Bush, 2002; Greyson &
Bush, 1992). Moreover, their prevalence seems to vary
widely. For example, most early studies on NDEs only
depicted positive emotions (Ring, 1980, 1984). Lindley
and collaborators (Lindley, Bryan, & Conley, 1981)
however published an interdisciplinary study in which
they identified 55 NDErs, of which eleven reported
“negative” experiences (including one “hellish”). More
recently, a study by our group (Charland-Verville et al.,
2014) pointed out that 10% of the sample did not
describe positive emotions. Overall, we should note
that the heterogeneous set of tools used to identify
negative NDEs might strongly influence the data. More-
over, some of these numbers may underestimate the
actual percentage. Indeed, although NDEs seem to
come out of the taboo atmosphere, some NDErs might
still feel reluctant to share them. This could be even
more the case when these experiences are perceived
as distressing or upsetting, as memory retrieval may be
painful and as people might feel stigmatised (Greyson
& Bush, 1992). Besides, as stated by Greyson and Bush
(1992), current widely used NDE questionnaires, such as
the Greyson NDE scale (Greyson, 1983) and the Weighted
Core Experience Index (WCEI) (Ring, 1980), only focus on
positive emotions and might fail in identifying these dis-
tressing experiences.
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Only a small number of empirical studies have
addressed distressing NDEs in-depth. In addition, most
of them have focused on single cases, thereby affecting
the generalisability of their observations (Bonenfant,
2001; Irwin & Bramwell, 1988). One noteworthy finding
is the existence of experiences beginning the same way
as classical NDEs, but that suddenly become negatively
toned. To learn more about the content of distressing
NDEs, Greyson and Bush (1992) looked closely into the
content of 50 self-reported accounts and identified three
subcategories of frightening experiences. Firstly, those
containing features similar to classical NDEs, with the
exception that the NDEr considers the whole experience
as unpleasant. According to these authors, it is the most
frequently reported type. These distressing NDEs had
already been described by Ring (1984) who called them
“inverse”, with reference to their resemblance with classi-
cal NDEs. Secondly, those in which the NDEr is in an iso-
lated and eternal void (i.e. “void” NDEs). Finally, the
rarest type, “hellish”, is described as experiences of visiting
hell-like regions and encountering demonic beings. Later,
Rommer (2000) suggested a fourth type in which NDErs
are heavily disturbed by a life review. This category has
however been classified by Bush (2002) as a subset of
the “hellish” experiences. Although there has been an
indication about the relative size of the different cat-
egories, the occurrence of these three subcategories in
the reported sample has not been supplied. In addition,
even though this pioneer article illustrates distressing
experiences by providing numerous verbatim accounts,
to date, no study has performed a rigorous analysis of
the phenomenology of these subtypes of NDEs by mul-
tiple coders.
Regarding potential causes, the unpredictable aspect of
NDEs makes it difficult to identify the psychological and
physiological status before a distressing experience
(Greyson & Bush, 1992). The literature has often suggested
a relationship between the negative emotional context of
suicides and the nature of the resulting NDE (Greyson &
Stevenson, 1980; Ring & Franklin, 1982). However, even if
this relationship remains largely under-explored, Ring
and Franklin (1982) have reported that suicide-related
NDEs are not different from NDEs in general. Overall, the
few available scientific data and the potentially long-
lasting emotional trauma triggered by frightening NDEs
advocate for further rigorous studies (Bush, 2002).
In this respect, we aim to (1) look for the proportion of
“distressing” NDEs in a relatively large sample of self-
reported NDE narratives; (2) classify the distressing narra-
tives by multiple assessors, in order to have a precise
estimate of the occurrence of the three subtypes of
“negative” NDEs; and (3) compare memories of distressing
and “classical” (i.e. experiences comprising typical features
and not perceived as negative) NDEs on the basis of their
content, intensity, phenomenological details and pro-




Participants were initially recruited following calls for NDE
testimonies via the websites, the appearances in local
media and the publications of the Coma Science Group
(GIGA-Consciousness, University and University Hospital
of Liège, Belgium) as well as the International Association
for Near-Death Studies (IANDS France and Flanders). They
were then mailed questionnaires including items relating
to socio-demographic (gender, age at NDE, age at inter-
view) and clinical (time since NDE, presence of a loss of
consciousness exceeding one hour) characteristics. Partici-
pants, who were not aware of the specific purpose of the
research, were subsequently invited to freely write down
a detailed description of the experience on blank sheets
of paper, with no restriction regarding text size. Lastly,
they were asked to complete the Greyson NDE scale
(Greyson, 1983). This validated 16-item questionnaire
enables the quantification of the intensity of a NDE (i.e.
the total score ranges from 0 to 32) and the identification
of “true” NDEs with a total cut-off score of 7 (Greyson,
1983; Lange, Greyson, & Houran, 2004). The Greyson NDE
scale assesses the presence and content of 16 features
that fall into four subscales (i.e. affective, cognitive, para-
normal and transcendental components). For each item,
scores are arranged on an ordinal scale ranging from 0 to
2 (i.e. 0 = “not present”,1 = “mildly or ambiguously
present”, and 2 = “definitively present”). We only included
experiences equal or above the cut-off score of 7 that
occurred following a severe brain injury accompanied by
a period of coma (loss of consciousness exceeding one
hour) and a hospitalisation in an intensive care unit.
Additionally, participants filled out a short version (D’Ar-
gembeau & Van der Linden, 2008) of the Memory Charac-
teristics Questionnaire (MCQ) (Johnson et al., 1988). It
includes 16 items (each rated on a 1–7 points Likert
scale) assessing the following categories of memory
characteristics: memory clarity, sensory details, self-referen-
tial and emotional information, reactivation frequency, and
confidence in the memory.
The study was carried out in accordance with the rec-
ommendations of the ethics committee of the Faculty of
Medicine of the University of Liège. The protocol was
approved by the ethics committee of the Faculty of Medi-
cine of the University of Liège. All participants completed a
written informed consent in accordance with the Declara-
tion of Helsinki.
Classification of distressing experiences
The first step consisted in identifying distressing NDE nar-
ratives. To that end, we evaluated responses at item 14 of
the short version of the MCQ (i.e. ‘When the event hap-
pened, my emotions were: −3 = “very negative”, 0
= “neutral”, +3 = “very positive”’) and selected the
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narratives that were rated between −1 and −3. All written
narratives were therefore divided into two main emotions-
related groups (i.e. distressing NDEs and “classical” NDEs).
The dataset, including distressing narratives that had to
be classified into three subtypes (i.e. inverse, void and
hellish), was created and composed of 5 Dutch and 12
French narratives. Their average length was of 975 words
per account (ranging from 206 to 4795). A detailed descrip-
tion of the subtypes (Greyson & Bush, 1992) was provided
to coders (i.e. two Dutch speakers and two French speak-
ers). Each account was then independently read by the
two coders who perfectly mastered the language in
which it was written. NDE features corresponding to each
of the three subtypes were highlighted in different
colours. The pre-determined features corresponding to
each type of distressing NDE can be found in Table 1.
The number of observed agreements was 5/5 for Dutch
narratives and 11/12 (92%) for French narratives. Inter-
rater reliability was assessed using a Cohen’s kappa coeffi-
cient. The closer the value to 1, the better the concordance
is between coders (Landis & Koch, 1977). We obtained a
Cohen’s kappa coefficient of 1 (“perfect” agreement) for
Dutch narratives and of 0.855 (95% confidence intervals
0.583-1; “very good” agreement) for French narratives. Dis-
crepancy was discussed in order to reach a final unanimous
categorisation.
Statistical analysis
We calculated the proportion (%) of distressing NDEs by
taking into account all the NDErs that had provided us
with a written narrative and who had duly completed all
questionnaires (i.e. Greyson NDE scale and MCQ) since
the beginning of enrolment in 2010. NDErs who reported
distressing NDEs were compared to NDErs who reported
classical NDEs regarding demographical and clinical infor-
mation. Differences between groups were assessed using
Student’s t-tests (for age at NDE, age at interview and
time elapsed since NDE) and Fisher’s exact tests (for aetiol-
ogy and gender). Results were considered significant at an
alpha of 0.05 (p < 0.05) and were expressed as mean ±
standard deviation (SD) for quantitative variables and as
counts and proportions (%) for the qualitative variables.
Regarding answers at questionnaires, Greyson NDE
scale scores distributions being skewed and the answers
at the MCQ being ordinal data measures, distressing and
classical NDEs were compared using Mann Whitney U
tests and results were expressed as median (inter-quartile
range). We corrected for multiple comparisons using a Bon-
ferroni correction, setting the criterion for statistical signifi-
cance at p < 0.0125 for the Greyson NDE subscales scores
and at p < 0.003 for the 16 items of the MCQ. The item
relating to the valence was included in our analysis to
ensure a clear difference between the two emotions-
related groups. As a second step, and in accordance with
recent recommendations (Dienes, 2014), we conducted
Bayesian Mann–Whitney tests in addition to frequentist
inferential analyses. Indeed, unlike classical inference
methods which can only provide evidence against the
null hypothesis, Bayesian methods have the advantage of
quantifying the evidence for and against it (Dienes,
2014). Regarding data interpretation, we considered a
Bayes Factor (BF) of <3 as anecdotal evidence, between 3
and 10 as moderate evidence, between 10 and 30 as
strong evidence, between 30 and 100 as very strong evi-
dence, and higher than 100 as decisive evidence for the
model tested relatively to the null or to another model
(Lee & Wagenmakers, 2014). BF10 indicates Bayesian evi-
dence for the presence of an effect relative to the null,
and BF01 indicates evidence for the null. Data analyses
were carried out using SPSS (Statistical Package for the
Social Sciences, version 22.0, SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL, USA)
and with the 0.9.0.1 version of the JASP software




We received the testimonies from 506 participants since
the beginning of the enrolment in 2010. Among these,
123 individuals met the criteria of an NDE (i.e. Greyson
NDE scale cut-off ≥7), had duly completed questionnaires
and were included in our analyses, of which 17 were
Table 1. General description and features belonging to distressing near-death experiences subtypes.
Type General description and features
Inverse Narratives contain classical NDE features but the event is considered as unpleasant (Greyson & Bush, 1992) Coders considered features described in
the two most used NDE scales (i.e. Greyson NDE scale and Weighted Core Experience Index –WCEI – scale (Greyson, 1983; Ring, 1980): (1) intense
feeling of joy, (2) peacefulness, (3) altered time perception, (4) accelerated thoughts, (5) vision of scenes belonging to one’s past/life review, (6)
sensation of understanding everything (about oneself, others or the universe), (7) feeling of harmony with the universe, (8) vision of a very bright
light, (9) communication with a light, (10) vision of/moving through a tunnel, (11) more vivid senses than usual, (12) being aware of things
happening elsewhere, (13) visions of the future, (14) out-of-body experience, (15) entering a non-terrestrial world, (16) encounter with a mystical
being/voice, (17) vision of dead or religious spirits, (18) coming to a border/point of no return, (19) awareness of being dead, (20) observation of
colours, (21) observation of a celestial landscape, and (22) darkness.
Void Narratives might contain features belonging to the classical type but in a smaller amount. Void accounts should also involve (1) an acute awareness
of nonexistence, (2) the sensation of being completely alone forever in an absolute void, and/or (3) receiving a convincing message saying that
the real world never existed (Greyson & Bush, 1992).
Hellish Narratives might also contain features belonging to the prototypical type and to the void type. This subtype should also encompass hellish imagery
and sounds such as 1) the vision of an ugly or foreboding landscape, 2) the presence of demonic beings, 3) hearing loud and/or annoying noises,
4) seeing frightening animals and/or 5) encountering other beings in extreme distress (Greyson & Bush, 1992).
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classified as distressing (14%). The distributions of demo-
graphic data of the two emotions-related subsamples
follow a normal distribution. Distressing and classical
NDErs do not differ in terms of gender and age at NDE. Dis-
tressing NDErs however include more suicide survivors,
and classical NDErs appear to be older at the time of the
interview and to present a longer time elapsed since NDE
(see Table 2).
Classification of distressing experiences
The final classification of all narratives includes 8 inverse, 8
hellish and 1 void (see Table 3 for an example of each
subtype of distressing NDE narratives). Additionally, the
text analyses revealed that out of the 17 distressing narra-
tives, 6 clearly mention the presence of positive feelings at
the beginning of the experience in their written narrative
(i.e. peacefulness and/or joy).
Comparison of distressing and classical experiences
The comparison of distressing and classical NDEs regarding
intensity (i.e. Greyson NDE scale total scores) and content
(i.e. Greyson NDE scale components) revealed that distres-
sing experiences show lower scores on the affective com-
ponent (p < 0.001). This was supported by Bayesian
analyses which showed decisive evidence in favour of a
difference between groups (see Table 4). By contrast, dis-
tressing and classical accounts do not seem to differ
regarding total score as well as on the three other com-
ponents of the Greyson NDE scale (i.e. cognitive, paranor-
mal and transcendental – see Table 4); Bayesian analyses
Table 3. Text excerpts of written distressing NDE narratives.
Type Selected text excerpts translated from French (gender, age at interview)
Inverse “First, I was sucked into a tunnel. Then, there was a descent into this tunnel. At an incredible speed. Perhaps the speed of light. A speed that does
not last, a flash. It is hard to describe in words, it is very different from what I have experienced in the ‘normal’ world. This speed gives me the
sensation of ‘no time’. In this tunnel, I saw flashes, ‘animated’ faces of missing people that I had loved (brother, grandfather). The smile of a little
boy murdered when I was five, and lots of people I did not know. I experienced this ‘journey’ three times. Each time I came back to life. I was
trying to tell the doctor that I was going back into the tunnel, that I would die again, but no sound came out of my mouth. At some point, the
anaesthesiologist said: ‘She tries to speak, I do not understand anything’. My mind was talking, screaming, calling for help. But nothing, no
reaction, as if I was in a parallel world. I suffered terribly physically, I was exhausted, I felt abandoned by living beings. I struggled, completely
alone, I did not want to join all these dead beings, although they were welcoming, reassuring. I knew I would die but I was not ready to give in
to the temptation of rest”. (Female, 57 years old)
Hellish “There are more and more entities surrounding me and this dark environment is unbearable. The deafening noise invades the space that becomes
increasingly dark. I would like this noise to stop. I am caught in a whirlwind, the dark grey haze around me is thick, and the smell and sound are
getting more unbearable […]. And I am beginning to distinguish forms in this incredibly thick fog. Human, bestial, monstrous. I am swimming in
a stinking stench filled with horrible and furtive creatures and I am feeling overwhelmed with pain. It hurts everywhere, no, worse, I am
becoming pain. I understand that my suffering is just beginning. And I am scared. A growing fear, appalling. I would like to close my eyes and
stop hearing and feeling. But it is impossible. My vision is very wide, I see everywhere at once, I see in front of me, above, below and on the
sides; only a small part on the back is not visible. The less I want to hear, see and feel, the more receptive I am. It is terrible, it is like I am
absorbing the pain and suffering of all these beings… I am extremely lucid, I feel aware like I have never been before. Time no longer exists. I
wish I could escape this place, escape time, but my anguish is such that I cannot move… as if these beings were holding me back. […] I
understand that I am between two worlds and that this in-between is none other than Hell”. (Female, 42 years old)
Void “I was in the dark. Time did not exist anymore. I did not have a physical body but the impression of being above it. There was no suffering. I was
nothing. Then, below me, I saw an accident, I saw a girl. She suffered horribly because she was screaming. It hurt to hear her shouting so loud.
Then, everything happened very quickly. This shouting person was me. I tried to get up, I screamed and I fell back. Anxious, I told to myself: ‘I am
dead. I do not want to stay in the dark, I want to go to paradise. I have the right to go, I have always done everything properly.’ I was floating
into the dark, unaware of what was happening around me. A presence came near me and told me in a loud, clear, authoritarian voice: ‘Paradise
does not exist!’. Self-confident, I answered that this is not true and I explained that I have never committed sins. […] The voice repeated: ‘After
death, it is over, there is nothing’. Teachers, priests and sisters taught me that if you never commit mortal sins, you go to heaven. I wanted to go
to heaven. The clear and firm voice told me: ‘All those who taught you that lied to you, after death there is nothing!’. […] The voice disappeared.
No more voice, nothing, it was over. I was desperate, I was crying. Then I fell into an endless darkness at full speed. Always faster. There was
nothing to stop me from falling. I was looking around to grab something. I realized there was nothing. It was total black. I was never going to
stop falling”. (Female, 60 years old)
Table 2. Demographical information of NDErs who experienced a distressing NDE vs. a classical NDE.
Distressing NDEs Classical NDEs p-Value







































Notes: *Results are significant. CI = Confidence interval. SD = Standard deviation.
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provided positive evidence for the absence of a difference.
The number of distressing NDErs recalling each type of
classical NDE feature included in the Greyson NDE scale
can be found in Figure 1. Regarding the amount of
memory details, the comparison of distressing and classical
NDEs revealed a difference regarding emotions felt at the
time of the event (i.e. valence) but the other items did
not differ; this was supported with Bayesian evidence for
the null effect for the majority of items (see Table 5).
More specifically, our results indicate stronger evidence
for no difference between distressing and classical NDEs
in terms of self-reported memory clarity, sensory details,
self-referential information, reactivation frequency, and
confidence in the memory. This was also the case for
emotion-related items, such as the personal importance
and the feelings experienced while remembering. To
ensure our results are not caused by the effect of con-
founding variables, we performed the analyses by control-
ling for age at interview and time since NDE, which led to
similar results.
Discussion
Our main goal was to better document distressing NDEs
which remain poorly studied (Bonenfant, 2001; Bush &
Greyson, 1994; Greyson & Bush, 1992; Irwin & Bramwell,
1988). This study investigated three major aspects of
these experiences: (1) the proportion of distressing NDEs
in our sample, (2) their distribution according to the
three categories previously established by Greyson and
Bush (1992), and (3) the phenomenological and contextual
differences existing between the memories of distressing
and classical NDEs.
With regard toourfirst aim, thedata suggests that distres-
sing NDEs represent 14% of our total NDE sample. Earlier
studies generally reported percentages ranging from 1% to
10% (e.g. Charland-Verville et al., 2014; Greyson & Bush,
1992). These different proportions can be attributed to the
very broad definitions of distressing NDEs, as well as the
varying methodologies. By contrast with previous research,
we used a rigorous methodology to identify distressing




















































Notes: Results for the components are considered statistically significant at p < 0.01 after Bonferroni correction. *Results are significant. IQR = Inter-quartile
range. SD = Standard deviation. BF10 = evidence in favour of an effect of the valence (distressing vs. classical) on the scores at the Greyson NDE scale. BF01 =
evidence in favour of a null effect of the valence (distressing vs. classical) on the scores at the Greyson NDE scale.
Figure 1. Number of distressing NDErs recalling each NDE feature by decreasing order.
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NDEs (i.e. an item asking NDErs to rate their emotions at the
time of the NDE). An additional plausible explanation is that
the distressing dimensions of the experience, added to its
mystical aspect, could deter people from sharing it. A combi-
nation of the aforementioned factors could contribute to the
observed discrepancies.
Our second objective was to replicate Greyson and
Bush’s (1992) classification of distressing NDEs in order to
give a more accurate estimate of the number of narratives
belonging to each subtype. Indeed, the aforementioned
authors did not indicate the number of accounts belonging
to each category and what proportion represents their
sample of distressing narratives when considering their
own database of testimonies. Interestingly, our distribution
is not fully in line with the results obtained by Greyson and
Bush (i.e. in decreasing order of frequency: the inverse, the
void and the hellish NDE; 1992). Indeed, the present
sample presents an equal number of inverse and hellish
NDE narratives and only one void experience. Although
the exact distribution differs, analyses seem to confirm
Greyson and Bush’s (1992) classification. Rommer (2000)
proposed a fourth type composed of a life review during
which the NDEr feels negatively judged by a higher
power being. We effectively found one distressing narra-
tive that included this feature and could match this
category but, in accordance to Bush’s (2002) view, it was
categorised as hellish. To date, little is known about the
resulting consequences of these subtypes of NDEs. Bush
and Greyson (1994) however described three possible
responses to frightening NDEs: (1) the negative event
may be perceived as a warning about unwise behaviours,
may lead to a self-analysis and ultimately to a “turn
around” in one’s life; (2) the NDErs may treat the event as
if it did not matter; and (3) the frightening event may
result in a difficulty to integrate the experience and in
the development of a sense of stigma. As already stated
by Bush and Greyson (1994), the literature on post-trau-
matic growth in NDErs still remains under documented
and deserves further research.
Regarding our last aim, distressing and classical NDEs
were found to have comparable total scores on the
Greyson NDE scale. A detailed analysis revealed that
these two types of experiences only differed on the
affective subscale. Those findings were expected since
three items clearly stipulate the presence of positively con-
noted emotions. Moreover, the bright light, often
described in NDE narratives (Charland-Verville et al.,
2014), is known to be often associated with positive
emotions such as feelings of happiness, serenity and tran-
quillity (Cassol et al., 2018; Facco & Agrillo, 2012). As










Feeling of re-experiencing 6(5–7) 6(5–7) 908.5 0.957 –0.005
(–0.181–0.172)
0.248 4.357
Visual details 7(6–7) 7(6–7) 1015 0.346 –0.085
(–0.258–0.093)
0.289 3.684
Other sensory details 5(3–7) 4(1–6) 1091.5 0.154 –0.129
(–0.299–0.049)
0.340 1.989
Location 7(3–7) 7(6–7) 756 0.183 –0.120
(–0.29–0.058)
0.265 4.584
Time 4(1–7) 3(1–6) 993 0.483 –0.064
(–0.238–0.114)
0.559 4.161
Coherence 7(5–7) 7(6–7) 789.5 0.421 –0.074
(–0.247–0.104)
0.264 4.255
Verbal component 4(3–5) 2(1–5) 1077 0.190 –0.119
(–0.289–0.059)
0.906 4.259
Feeling emotions 7(5–7) 6(5–7) 958 0.612 –0.046
(–0.221–0.132)
0.219 4.621
Real/imagined 7(6–7) 7(7–7) 819.5 0.466 –0.066
(–0.24–0.112)
0.308 3.715
One’s own actions 7(3–7) 7(5–7) 851 0.790 –0.025
(–0.201–0.152)
0.222 4.159
One’s own words 6(4–7) 6(1–7) 990.5 0.448 –0.069
(–0.243–0.109)
0.363 4.438
One’s own thoughts 7(6–7) 7(5–7) 1069 0.149 –0.131
(–0.041–0.284)
0.267 4.339
Visual perspective 6(2–7) 6(4–7) 740 0.214 –0.113
(–0.284–0.065)
0.199 4.365
Valence 1(1–3) 7(6–7) 143 <0.001* –0.559
(–0.669– –0.424)
64911 <0.001
Personal importance 7(6–7) 7(6–7) 899 0.989 –0.002
(–0.178–0.175)
0.593 3.768
Reactivation frequency 7(5–7) 6(4.25–7) 996 0.460 –0.067
(–0.241–0.111)
0.264 4.766
Notes: Results for the MCQ items are considered statistically significant at p < 0.003 after Bonferroni correction. *Results are significant. IQR = Inter-quartile
range. BF10 = evidence in favour of an effect of the valence (distressing vs. classical) on the scores at the MCQ. BF01 = evidence in favour of a null effect of
the valence (distressing vs. classical) on the scores at the MCQ.
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previously stated in Greyson and Bush (1992), scales such
as the WCEI (Ring, 1980) or the Greyson NDE scale
(Greyson, 1983) seem to place a high value on positive feel-
ings and may therefore be biased and lack sensibility in the
identification of negative experiences. It is however inter-
esting to note that, although distressing experiences are
significantly less positive, we do not only observe zero
values on the affect component of the Greyson NDE
scale. By means of a rigorous text analysis, we identified
the presence of positive emotions in distressing NDE narra-
tives and highlighted the presence of peacefulness feelings
in the beginning of several accounts. Our results therefore
seem to corroborate previous studies describing a combi-
nation of blissful and frightening elements in some distres-
sing NDEs (e.g. Bonenfant, 2001; Sabom, 1982). Thus, it
should also be emphasised that these distressing experi-
ences could be misinterpreted as positive on the unique
basis of the Greyson NDE scale. In parallel, results indicate
that memories of distressing NDEs are likely to contain as
much overall phenomenological details as memories of
classical NDEs. A Bayesian analysis revealed no evidence
in favour of a difference between the memories of these
two types of events, except for the valence. Given that
the MCQ allows the assessment of the subjective experi-
ence associated with remembering an event (Johnson
et al., 1988), this indicates that as compared to memories
of classical NDEs, memories of distressing NDEs are associ-
ated with a comparable memory clarity, as well as a similar
amount of sensory, self-referential and emotional details
(i.e. personal importance and feelings experienced while
remembering). Moreover, they seem to be retrieved in
memory at the same frequency as memories of classical
NDEs. Finally, both kinds of NDErs present the same level
of confidence in their memory and appear to assign com-
parable personal importance to the experience. Therefore,
our results showed that the memory of distressing NDEs
contains a similar level of self-reported phenomenological
details as the memory of classical NDEs which are known to
be vivid and highly detailed (Thonnard et al., 2013). Finally,
we observed a higher proportion of suicidal attempt
context in distressing NDErs. Thereupon, we speculate
that the negative context surrounding NDEs may have
partly influenced their emotional valence. In accordance
with neuroscientific and psychological approaches to
NDEs (Blackmore, 1996), we hypothesise that their
content, in this case the emotional valence, could be
influenced by “top-down” processes (i.e. NDErs’ knowl-
edge, beliefs and expectations) that are more influential
when sensory information is degraded (e.g. altered states
of consciousness) or ambiguous.
Overall, we believe that future research should essen-
tially focus on the exploration and understanding of the
consequences of these distressing experiences. Past
studies focusing on classical NDEs have found that these
experiences are self-defining (Cassol, D’Argembeau, Char-
land-Verville, Laureys, & Martial, 2019) and have a powerful
force of personal change generally reported as very
positive (Schwaninger et al., 2002; Van Lommel et al.,
2001). Moreover, through their model of sense-making
processes and assimilation problems, Bianco, Sambin,
and Palmieri (2017) have shown that making sense of a
NDE can be a problematic issue, notably because one’s pre-
vious models about the world may be incongruent with
the unusual nature of the NDE-related information. It
could therefore be reasonable to think that distressing
NDEs might have some powerful negative consequences
on NDErs’ psychological health. Through a better under-
standing of such distressing experiences and their conse-
quences, we may become better equipped to target
NDErs at high risk of developing long-lasting emotional
trauma.
Regarding this study, it should also be noted that the
cross-sectional and retrospective design could potentially
represent a source of bias in the sense that narratives
may have been tainted by widespread descriptions of
NDEs in the media and in lay literature. Greyson (2007)
however highlighted the consistency of NDE memories
over a period of two decades. Additionally, since NDErs
voluntarily contacted our team, our sample might suffer
from a self-selection bias and the proportion of distressing
NDEs might not be genuinely representative. Overall, pro-
spective data collection could constitute a way to address
these issues.
Conclusion
We confirmed Greyson and Bush’s (1992) classification
which includes inverse, void and hellish NDEs. NDErs
report similar ratings for the phenomenological details of
distressing and classical NDE memories, which are both
highly vivid. This work paves the way for research on the
prevalence and consequences of distressing experiences.
Frightening NDEs are under documented and require
specific attention to be integrated into NDErs’ identity.
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